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The Preamble of the German Grundgesetz–Constitutional 
Status and Importance of Preambles in German Law
Abstract. Generally, normative acts are passed without preambles in Germany. The federal Basic Law of 1949, 
like the Wei mar Constitution of 1919, however, did contain a preamble, which has been modiﬁ ed in 1990, upon 
German reuniﬁ cation. The predominant view on that preamble minimizes its importance for the interpretation of 
the operative sections of the Grundgesetz. Until 1990, the only normative directive read into the preamble by the 
Constitutional Court was the precept of the reuniﬁ cation of Germany. According to most authorities on 
constitutional law, the introductory reference to God (nominatio or invocatio dei) has no legal connotation 
whatsoever.
Keywords: proems to normative acts-nature and legal relevance, preambles in German legislation, the 1949 and 
1990 preambles to the Grundgesetz, the precept of reuniﬁ cation of Germany as a normative directive before 1990, 
the reference to God (invocatio dei)
A) Introduction
Preambles, i.e. prologues or prolegomena, to operative parts of le gislation take different 
shapes, and legislators pass normative acts to gether with such preliminary sections for quite 
different reasons.1 Constitutio nal preambles might include references to the historical or 
political circumstances leading to the making or to the amending of a constitution. They 
might identify the bearers of the constituent power with respect to a particular territorial 
entity, or epitomize the political and moral conceptions of the drafters of the new 
codiﬁ cation. As will be seen, both versions of the preamble to the German Basic Law (the 
preamble of 1949 and the revised version of 1990, replacing the original wording upon 
German reuniﬁ cation) are very much related to the legal circum stances and political 
conditions leading to their adoptions at the resepctive date of their origin. Especially the 
original preamble of 1949, but, albeit to a lesser extent, the preamble of 1990, were also 
intended to point to the future.
Whereas the federal consitution of Germany, i.e. the Basic Law, as well as 14 out of 
the 16 constitutions of the federated Laender of Germany contain preambles, ordinary legal 
acts drafted after 1949, only rarely are preceded by introductory sections. Only statutory 
instruments (so-called “Verordnungen”), shall, according to article 80 of the German Basic 
Law, contain an introductory statement of their legal basis.2
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westlichen Welt. In: Hermann, H. (ed.): Gesetzesvorspruch. 1988, 37; Varga, Cs.: The Preamble: 
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2 Cf. Papenheim, A.: Präambeln in der deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte seit Mitte des 19. 
Jahrhunderts. Doctoral thesis, Münster, 1998, passim.
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In other legal orders, introductory sections of ordinary legal acts frequently refer to the 
normative or constitutional basis of the particular act in superior legal norms, or they give 
reasons for or justify that act of legislation. Such references and justiﬁ cations preceding the 
operative part of a law are known from the EU regulations or directives according to art. 
296 TFEU3 and they are commonly applied, e.g. in Spain, in the UK and the USA. In 
Germany, if the legislator deems it appropriate to give reasons for or justify his particular 
act of legislation, one ore more articles will be included in the operative part of the law, 
usually in an introductory section, holding so-called “Leitvorschriften”, i.e. guiding rules. 
And even in the few cases where a preamble has preceded a legal act in German legislation 
since 1949, the opera tive articles of that act contained additional guiding rules, stating the 
purpose of legislating or containing deﬁ nitions.
B) Preambles in German legislation
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the legislator’s general dislike of proems to normative 
acts may be explained with the preceding practice of the Third Reich and the practice of the 
German Democratic Republic and, possibly, also with an aversion to the legislation of the 
authori ties of the Allied Forces occupying Germany, Allied directives frequently including 
detailed introductory sections on the purpose and scope of a particular act. In the Third 
Reich and, to some extent, also in the German Democratic Republic, preambles to laws 
were quite a costumary way of informing the public of the ideological basis for and, thus, a 
manner to determine the content of a normative rule, and they were sometimes of more 
importance for the interpretation of a concrete act of legislation than the wording of the bill 
itself. As one author said in 1988, many legal acts passed under National Socialism, were 
literally opposed with their preambles. Such preambles were sometimes longer than the 
operative sections and they were deemed to be more closely related to real life and 
considered as more immediate and, therefore, less questionable manifestations of the will of 
the legislator. Thus, one could get the impression that the proems were intended to 
undermine the positive normative rules following.4
In spite of the mentioned general dislike of preambles, in exceptional cases, the 
German legislator, when passing a legal act, still felt it appropriate to make some delcaratory 
statement and include it by way of an introductory statement, even after 1949. Thus, in the 
case of the Lastenausgleichsgesetz (Equalisation of Burdens Act) of August 14, 1952, the 
preamble contained an acknowledgement of the special sufferings of the ethnic German 
expellees from the East with, however, no practical re levance for the system of equalization 
of burdens. The preamble was merely meant to be a po litical statement and it was not a 
substitute for those “Leitvorschriften”, i.e. guiding rules in the ﬁ rst section of the law, 
especially art. 1, stating the “goals” of the compensatory payments to individuals for losses 
during and after World War II and the further articles containing deﬁ nitions. 
When, after World War II, the Austrian State regained its independence from the 
Germany, the authorities of Western Germany and Austria disagreed on the question, if and 
at what moment legal personality and capa city of Austria had been restored and whether 
Austrians had lost German ci tizenship as of April 26, 1945, or at some later date, or not at 
3 Art. 253 EC which has been replaced by art. 296 TFEU as of Nov. 1st, 2009, has been analyzed 
by Naumann, K.: Eine religiöse Referenz in einem Europäischen Verfassungsvertrag. Tübingen, 2008, 
115–117.
4 Siedentopf: op. cit. 42.
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all. When re gulating the loss of German citizenship by Austrians in 1956, the German le-
gislator deemed it appropriate to state the ofﬁ cial German legal point of view concerning 
the fate of the Austrian State in 1938 in a preamble to that act. According to that preamble 
the German Act of 1938 on Re uniﬁ cation of Austria and Germany had been valid at the 
time it was en acted, and it had only ceased to be in force at the end of World War II. Thus, 
Germany explicitly disagreed with the Austrian position, claiming that the law declaring the 
“Anschluß” had been void ab initio.5
C) The Constitutional Preamble
While ordinary laws generally were passed without preambles in the Federal Re public of 
Germany after 1949, the federal Basic Law of 1949, like the Wei mar Constitution of 1919, 
contained a preamble–as do, according to an Austrian scholar, 143 out of 191 contemporary 
constitutions worldwide.6 The original preamble to the Grundgesetz had the following 
wording: “The German People in the Laender Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, 
Hesse, Lower Saxony, North rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, 
Wuerttemberg-Baden and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, conscious of its responsibility 
 before God and Men, animated by the resolve to preserve its national and political unity 
and to serve the peace of the World as an equal partner in a united Europe, desiring to give 
a new order to political life for a trans itional period, has enacted, by virtue of its constituent 
power, this Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.
It has also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied.
The entire German people is called on to achieve in free self-determination the unity 
and freedom of Germany.”
After World War I, in the Case of the 1919 Constitution, it was the general view that 
the preamble contained only some delcaratory remarks concerning free dom, justice, peace 
and progress. As Hermann von Mangoldt has stressed in his monograph explaining the 
Basic Law,7 “under the pre sent circumstances”, i.e. the situation of the year 1949, the 
signiﬁ cance of the introductory remarks to the Basic Law must be viewed quite differently, 
having regard to certain aspects of the history of origin of the Grundgesetz (von Mangoldt 
was the leading public law expert among the CDU-members of the Parliamentary Council, 
whose members, from September 1, 1948, to May 8, 1949, were drafting the Grundgesetz 
basing themselves on proposals of the Council of Experts convened in Herrenchimsee in 
August 1948). 
The legal moment of those introductory remarks, i. e. of the preamble to the 
Grundgesetz, could, of course, not be predicted when passing the Basic Law in 1949. One 
reason is the unforeseeable future state of Germany. Another aspect should be mentioned, 
too: According to the German Grundgesetz, the Federal Constitutional Court was and still is 
to be the Court of last (and in most cases also of ﬁ rst) instance in all questions concerning 
the authentic interpretation of the Grundgesetz and of ju diciary review, and it is considered 
by some authors to be the equivalent of a permanent constitutional assembly. However, it 
cannot be doubted that the drafters of the preamble to the Basic Law in the Bonn 
5 Cf. Hailbronner, K.–Renner, G.–Maaßen, H.-G.: Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht. 5th ed., Munich, 
2010, 2. StAngRegG marginal no. 2.
6 Schambeck, H.: Verfassungsrecht, Religion und Geschichte. In: Kohl, G.−Neschwara, 
Ch.−Simon, T. (eds): Festschrift für Wilhelm Brauneder. Vienna, 2008, 469, 474.
7 von Mangoldt, H.: Das Bonner Grundgesetz. 1st ed., Berlin, 1953, 29.
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Parliamentary Council, wanted their constitution to be read and interpreted subject to certain 
provisos, based on the special circumstances of post-war Germany, which should be 
included in a preamble.
D. The Situation of 1949 mirrowing in the Preamble to the Grundgesetz
In 1948/49, it was the Western Allied Powers, who suggested to the Laender of the 
American, British and French zones of occupation to form a federal West German State. Its 
constitution should be drafted by a con stituent assembly elected by the people in the several 
Laender and it should then be ratiﬁ ed by the Military Governors. Finally, it was to be 
submitted to popular vote and it was supposed to enter into force upon being accepted by a 
simple, though not qualiﬁ ed, majority of voters in at least two-thirds of the Laender. 
The offer of the Western Allies to support the foundation of a West German Federation 
was considered to be a mixed blessing by the Laender. The Minister-Presidents, i.e. the 
heads of Laender governments, got into a state of conﬂ ict: There was the real danger that a 
State limited to the Western Zones of occupied Germany would further deepen the division 
between East and West. The Laender Prime Ministers accepted the offer of the Western 
allies albeit only with important reservations. The federal State to be established by the 
Laender in the Western Zones of Germany should be set up as a transitory entity and it 
should cease to exist upon Ger many regaining its unity. Therefore, the assembly drafting 
the Con stitution of that provisional State was not to be a constituent assembly elected by 
the people at large, but it was rather conceived as a Parliamentary Council, whose members 
were to be elected by the parliaments of the several Laender. The con stitutional draft 
presented by that Parliamentary Council should not be submitted to popular vote as 
suggested by the Allied Powers; instead of being accepted by the people at large it should 
by ratiﬁ ed by a qualiﬁ ed majority of the Parliaments of the Laender involved in the drafting 
pro cess. And to make it clear that the new fundamental law of the provisional fe deral State 
to be established was supposed to be provisional or transitional as well, that act was to be 
called Basic Law (Grundgesetz) instead of Constitution (Verfassung). In the beginning of 
the drafting process it was planned to conceive the Basic Law merely as an organisational 
statute of an occupied country. The Parliamentary Council wanted the preamble to the Basic 
Law, among others, to mirror the special circumstances of occupation, and the Council had 
therefore intended to adopt the following reference in the preamble to the limitations 
imposed upon the independence of the Federal Republic by the occupying powers: “The 
occupation of Germany by foreign powers has subjected the exercise of the right [to the 
free formation of national life] to severe limitations.” 
At a later stage, the General Drafting Committe of the Parliamentary Council, however, 
thought that a preamble stressing the restrictions to sovereignty caused by the Allied 
occupation would sound too much like resignation, and, ﬁ nally, they avoided any mention 
in the Basic Law of the occupation regime and the legal relationship of the German law-
maker to it. The historical circumstances of 1948/49 were, rather on the contrary, even 
veiled by the ﬁ nal draft of the pre amble: Though the members of the Council drafting the 
Grundgesetz were neither chosen by immediate popular election nor did they submit the 
Grundgesetz to a popular referendum, the preamble stated that “the German People in the 
[enumerated] Laender, has enacted, by virtue of its constituent power, this Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany.” When the drafting process of the Basic Law was completed, 
the fundamental law for Federal Germany was, there fore, no longer considered as just an 
58 MICHEAL SILAGI
organisational statute of an occupied country. It had, rather, in the Words of the Constitutional 
Court, “ultimately assumed the guise of the constitutional charter of a sovereign state”.8
With respect to the unforeseeable future, the Parliamentary Council had been very 
fortunate to drop its complaints for the lack of sovereignty and not to stress in the preamble 
to the Basic Law that, in 1949, the Parliamentary Council lacked self-determination and, 
therefore, could not pass a con stitution proper. In 1990, those voices that were stressing the 
provisional cha racter of the Grundgesetz of 1949 by referring to the preamble, and, upon 
reuniﬁ cation, were therefore pleading for its replacement by a genuine constitution for the 
whole of Germany, could easily be ignored. Upon reuniﬁ cation of the divided State of 
Germany in 1990, it would have been, however, much more difﬁ cult to refrain from drafting 
a genuine new constitution, had there been any ex plicit reservation in the original draft of 
the Grundgesetz, as to the lack of of German sovereignty in 1949.
Besides the dropped proviso concerning the lack of sovereignty of the entity to be 
called Federal Republic of Germany, the Parliamentary Coun cil, when drafting the 
Grundgesetz, wanted several provisos to be in cluded in its preamble. According to von 
Mangoldt9 they were a) the right of the German people to self-determination, b) German 
unity, c) the enforced territorial limitation of the order to be established to only one part of 
Germany, i.e. Western Germany, d) the invitation of other, still excluded, parts of Germany 
to accede to the newly formed State, e) the name of the newly formed entity and f) its 
relationship to the German Reich, i.e. the question of continuity or State succession, then, 
under g), the provisional character of the fundamental Law to be passed, and, ﬁ nally, h) the 
dropped statement on the lack of sovereignty. Except for the last point, all provisos had 
been somehow referred to in the Titel of or in the preamble to the Basic Law in 1949.
Already the title “Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (“Basic Law for 
the Federal Republic of Germany”) was meant to be an allusion to the last three provisos 
and the legal viewpoint of the majority of the members of the Council. The ﬁ rst part, 
“Federal Republic”, replacing “Reich”, was to indicate some distance from the Reich, 
especially the “Third Reich”. That “Federal Republic” was used as an attributive noun to 
qualify Germany, was, of course, also meant as a plea for German unity. But calling the 
new State “Germany” should ﬁ rst of all demonstrate the identity of the Federal Republic 
with the Reich. Not only the ofﬁ cial name of the Federal Republic, but also the statements 
in the preamble, accord ing to which the “the German People [...] has enacted, by virtue of 
its constituent power, this Basic Law” and that the “German People” was “animated by the 
resolve to preserve its national and political unity”, re ferred to the identity of the Federal 
Republic with the German Reich that was supposed to be “preserved”. Besides calling the 
constitution “Basic Law”, the pre amble expressed the desire for a “new order to political 
life for a trans itional period”.
The references to the German people and to national and political unity alluded also to 
three underlying aspects of the situation of divided post-war Germany, which, according to 
von Mangoldt, had to be taken into account by the preamble to the Grundgesetz. These 
aspects were the question of German unity, then, the enforced territorial partition, allowing 
the new order to be estab lished only in the Western parts of Germany, and, ﬁ nally, the 
invitation of other, still excluded, parts of Germany to accede to the newly formed State. 
The 2nd sentence of the preamble, therefore, declared that the Ger man people, by enacting 
8 Decisions of the BVerfG, Vol. 1, Part I, Baden-Baden, 1992, 19.
9 von Mangoldt: op. cit., 30. 
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the Basic Law, “has also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was 
denied”. And the 3rd sentence of the preamble was not only a mere declaration, but it called 
upon “the entire German people [...] to achieve in free self-determination the unity and 
freedom of Germany”. Though the preamble was silent on and avoided any hint at the 
infringements of the occupation, this last sentence explicitly adverted to the right of the 
German people to self-determination as a precondition for the German people to become, as 
the preamble declared in its ﬁ rst sentence, “an equal partner in a united Europe”. Thus, the 
authors of the Grundgesetz were demanding for the German State equal treatment and non-
discrimination according to the general principles of international law. 
E. The Legal Relevance of the Preamble
The reach of any legal impact of the original preamble could, of course, not be predicted at 
the time of the passing of the Basic Law in 1949. As mentioned before, it was up to the 
Karlsruhe Constitutional Court to ascribe material import to the preamble.10 And until 1990, 
the only normative directive read into that preamble by the supreme constitutional judges, 
was the precept of reuniﬁ cation of Germany. It was their 1957 judgment ordering the 
dissolution of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and thereby forbidding any further 
ac tivities of the KPD, which is considered to have been the guiding decision concerning the 
legally binding commitment of all German State organs to reuniﬁ cation. 
When the Communist Party was to be dissolved, because it was said to oppose and 
ﬁ ght the free democratic basis order established under the Grundgesetz, the attorneys 
defending the party argued that dissolution of the KPD would impede reuniﬁ cation and 
would, therefore, violate the Basic Law. In the ﬁ rst headnote of its dissolution order of 
August 17, 1956, the Court conﬁ rmed that the preamble to the Basic Law, though of special 
political importance, had also legal implications for the State organs. All State organs of the 
Fe deral Republic were obliged to aspire “with all strength” German unity and to refrain 
from actions impeding or making impossible reuniﬁ cation. The dissolution of the KPD was 
therefore decreed under the resolutory con dition of all-German elections, in the case of 
which a Communist party would be allowed to run again.
The precept of reuniﬁ cation played a role again in the case con cerning the Basic Treaty 
of December 21, 1972 between the Federal Repulic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic initiated by Bavaria. Only after its entry into force, on July 31, 1973, the Court 
gave an interpretation of that treaty in the light of the reuniﬁ cation precept of the preamble. 
The treaty was qualiﬁ ed as an inter se agreement between to segments of Germany that 
were separated from each other not by an international border but by a border similar to that 
be tween to West German Laender. If Karlsruhe had handed down that opinion, binding on 
the State organs of the Federal Re public, before ratiﬁ cation documents had been exchanged 
between Bonn and East Berlin, the German Democratic Republic would probably have 
stopped the exchange pro cedures. Therefore, the German Constitutional Court did not even 
grant an injunction demanded by Bavaria, but decided ex post, on July 31, 1973. 
Except for the precept of reuniﬁ cation with its very limited inﬂ uence on practical 
politics, the legal signiﬁ cance of the old preamble can be ne glected. But the hazards of 
interpretation might have led to quite some problems in 1990. At that time a serious 
10 A list of the nine decisions of the Constitutional Court having referred to the preamble until 
2009 is presented by Hobe, S. In: Berliner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz. Berlin (looseleaf, instalment 
of December 2009), marginal nos. 150–158.
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discussion took place, as to whether Germany could continue with a Basic Law intended to 
be provisional. In this connection, along with its preamble, the ﬁ nal article of the old 
constitution could also be mentioned, where it said that “This Basic Law shall cease to be 
inforce on the day on which a Constitution adopted by the free decision of the Ger man 
people comes into force.” Read in conjunction with the desire ex pressed in the preamble “to 
give a new order to political life for a trans itional period”, the Constitutional Court could 
have possibly disagreed with the perpetu ation of the Basic Law by transforming it into a 
regular constitution.
In the end, however, the provisos concerning the transitional and provisional character, 
which were inserted into the premable of the Grundgesetz in 1949, did not prevent the 
German legislator to extend the ter ritorial scope of the original Basic Law to the former 
German Democratic Republic as of October 3, 1990. 
F. The New Preamble of 1990
Upon reuniﬁ cation, some provisions of the Basic Law became out of date, however, and 
internationally improper. According to the “Two-plus-Four” Treaty of September 12, 1990, 
terminating the Allied rights and responsibilities for Germany, the existing outer frontiers of 
the two German States were to be ﬁ nal, and Germany under took not to raise any further 
territorial claims. Therefore, art. 23 of the Basic Law of 1949, allowing ad mission of “other 
parts of Germany” to the territorial scope of the Basic Law, had to be cancelled. Concerning 
the preamble, the pre sent order could no longer be conceived as to be meant for a transitional 
period of time only. According to the “Two-plus-Four” Treaty, there were also no longer 
any “Germans to whom participation was denied”. The new pre amble therefore reads: 
“Conscious of its responsibility before God and Men,
Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united 
Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constitutent power, have adopted this 
Basic Law.
Germans in the Laender of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bran denburg, 
Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Northrhine-
Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein 
and Thuringia have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination. 
This Basic Law thus applies to the entire German people.” 
We have already mentioned that, if at all, the preamble of 1990 was only to a lesser 
extent intended to point to the future than the original preamble of 1949. Its main importance 
lies in the delcaratory remarks concerning the territorial saturation of the German State after 
reuni ﬁ cation and concerning the end of the transitional period. 
Still, in a decision of 2009, the German Constitutional Court referred to the 
“determination to pro mote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe”. Proclaimed 
in the preamble to the Basic Law. In itself, that statement does, of course, not stipulate any 
obligations for the State organs taking part in interna tional efforts to develop a closer 
European Union, but as the Court held on June 30, 2009, in the decision concerning the 
Lisbon Treaty, the pre amble emphasises the “moral basis of responsible self-determination” 
and, on the other hand, the “willingness to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united 
Europe”.11 This willingness becomes operational only, if read in con junction with the ope-
rative clauses of the Basic Law on integration (arts 23, 24, 26). It is these clauses that lend 
11 BVerfG, Lisbon Decision of 30 June 2009, marginal no. 222.
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empowerment to the declaration of willingness, declared in the preamble.12 Therefore, it is 
from art. 23.1 of the Basic Law “and its preamble” that follows the “constitutional mandate 
to realise a united Europe”.13 Needless to say that the Court could have reached its 
conlusions as well without any reference to the “determination to promote world peace as 
an equal partner in a united Europe” as declared by the preamble. 
G.  “Conscious of its responsibility before God ...”–On the reference to God 
in the Grundgesetz
“Conscious of its responsibility before God and Men” (or mankind?) is the initial phrase, 
one might say the preamble to the preamble, of both the 1949 and the 1990 versions of the 
introduction to the Basic Law. The preamble to the Weimar Constitution did not refer to 
God,14 and also the Herrenchimsee proposal of August 1948 did not yet containing any 
nominatio dei.15 It was only at a late stage of its drafting by the Parliamentary Council that 
the quoted initial phrase of the Grundgesetz was ﬁ rst included in the preamble. There, “God 
and Men” as two cumulative points of reference for the re claimed responsibility of the 
legis lator of the Grundgesetz, were placed next to each other. Technically speaking, the 
introductory phrase of the preamble does not imply an “invocatio dei”, but a “nominatio 
dei”, a mere reference to God. The juxtaposition of God and Men minimizes, of course, the 
plausibility of any assertion of a speciﬁ c religious connotation of the reference to God. It is 
hardly justi ﬁ able or arguable, at least as far as the original version of 1949 is con cerned, to 
read more into the two references, made simultaneously and equally, to God and to Men, 
than a mere demonstration of awareness of the historic situation that led to the drafting of 
the new Basic Law and a change of consciousness due to the ex periences, the German 
people had made during the years of National So cialism. Therefore, and considering the 
strict religious and ideological neutrality decreed by several operative articles of the Basic 
Law (ﬁ rst, by art. 4 on religious freedom, then, by art. 3 paragr. 3 and art. 33 paragr. 3, 
explicitly forbidding discrimination for religious or ideological reasons, and, ﬁ nally, also by 
art. 140 with regard to re ligious association), most authorities on the Grundgesetz will agree 
that the reference to God in the preamble has “no legal connotation”.16
Still, authors, of course, differ in their interpretations of the invo cation of “God” in the 
preamble, and, notwithstanding the juxtaposition of God and Men, the historic circumstances, 
and the operative clauses in the Grundgesetz on strict religious neu trality, some constitutional 
lawyers see it differently. As late as 2009, one author commenting on the preamble wrote 
that the invocation of God, though not de creeing a State religion, was meant to refer to the 
threefold God of Chri stianity.17 The author differentiates between the responsibility before 
God and that before Men, devoting ﬁ ve times more space to his re marks on God than to 
12 Lisbon Decision, marginal no. 222.
13 Lisbon Decision, marginal no. 225.
14 According to Schambeck: op. cit., only 65 out of 143 contemporary constitutional preambles 
refer to God.
15 On the different proposals concerning a naming of God (nominatio dei) or an invocation of 
God (invocatio dei) in the Basic Law, cf. Murswiek, D. In: Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz. 
Heidelberg (looseleaf, instalment of September 2005), Präambel, marginal no. 19–24.
16 Leisner, W. G. In: Sodan, H.: Grundgesetz. Munich, 2009, Präambel, marginal no. 2.
17 See Hillgruber, Ch. In: Epping, V.–Hillgruber, Ch. (eds): Grundgesetz. Munich, 2009, 
Präambel, marginal no. 7.
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those on Man. That interpretation would bring the God of the German preamble close to 
that of the Irish and Greek consti tutions, the main difference beeing that Germany, of 
course, has no State Religion, the lack of a State religion beinig explicitly conﬁ rmed by art. 
140 of the Basic Law. 
The predominant view on the preamble, therefore, minimizes the importance of God. 
In the already quoted monograph of von Mangoldt on the Basic Law any reference to the 
invocation of God is missing. Von Mangoldt, himself a Christian Democrat, was commenting 
every other phrase of the preamble, also stressing differences between the Weimar and the 
Bonn preambles, but he did not even mention the introductory phrase of the Bonn preamble 
of 1949 concerning the responsibility before God and Men, al though, in this point, the 
Weimar preamble was quite different. In 1991, Dieter Hömig, then member of the Federal 
Administrative Court, dropped only one sentence on the reference to God, when commen-
ting the preamble of the Basic Law. He wrote that nothing could be drawn from the reference 
to God and Men but an indication to the “ideological state of the legislators” in 1949.18 In 
2010, the author, after having served on the bench of the Karlsruhe Constitu tional Court, is 
less harsh, without, however, changing his opinion substantially. Ac cording to the 2010 
edition of his comment, the reference to God still does not contain any religious or 
ideological message in the stricter sense. In his view, stressing the responsibility before God 
an Men, is tanta mount to a re jection of all forms of totalitarianism and to confessing a 
minimum stan dard of pre-set values.19
Hömig’s conception of the introductory clause of the preamble seems to be the 
prevailing understanding of it. That his interpretation is correct, can be seen from the limited 
or rather non-existing practical relevance of the “nominatio dei” in constitutional jurisdiction. 
It has not been referred to by the German Constitutional Court, especially in the recent 
cases concerning religious instruction in East Germany. It has also not been discussed, when 
the Court had to decide on the question of shop closing hours, where the special protection 
of Sun days and religious holi days by the Basic Law was afﬁ rmed by the Court, or in the 
case concer ning removal of cruciﬁ xes from class-rooms. If the appelants in a constitutional 
com plaint (e.g. concerning religious instruction in Bran denburg) argue with the invocation 
of God in the preamble, the Court dismisses that argument for procedural reasons without 
referring at all to the invocation in the merits, because no en forceable rights can be drawn 
by appellants of a constitutional complaint out of the preamble.
As to the several Laender of the Federal Republic of Germany, nine out of the 16 
constitutions of the Laender do not refer to God in their preambles at all20 (the Constitutions 
of Saarland and of Schleswig-Holstein do not contain preambles at all)–already before 
reuniﬁ cation, it was seven out of eleven constitutions, among them the Saarland: Contrary 
to the French conception of secularism, the constitu tion introduced in the territory of 
Saarland, when it was under French control after World War II, contained a preamble with a 
reference to God.21 Upon reintegration into the Federal Republic of Germany, in 1957, the 
18 Hömig, D.: Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. (Seifert, K.-H.–Hömig, D. 
eds), 2nd ed., Baden-Baden, 1991, Präambel, marginal no. 2.
19 Hömig: op. cit., 9th ed., 2010, Präambel, marginal no. 2.
20 In Austria, neither the federal constitution nor the basic laws of the federated Laender–with 
the exception of the preamble to the Tyrolian constitution of 1989–contain references to God. Cf. 
Moser, M.: Nicht jedem Anfang wohnt ein Zauber inne. Vom B-VG 1920 zur gegenwärtigen 
Präambeldiskussion. In: Ehs, T. (ed.): Hans Kelsen. Vienna, 2009, 193 (201).
21 Bosig, R.: Die Verfassung des Saarlandes. Cologne, 2001, 128.
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preamble was removed. On the other hand, the provisional Constitution of Lower Saxony 
of 1951 and the Constitution of 1993 did not contain a pre amble. But in 1994 the 
representative organs of the Protestants, the Catholics, and of the Jews in Lower Saxony 
were demanding the inclusion of God into the new Constitution, and they succeeded in 
collecting 120  000 signatures in a po pular initiative. Thereupon, the Parliament of Lower 
Sa xony amended the Constitution. An introductory clause, similar to the ﬁ rst part of the 
prologue to the Grundgesetz, was adopted, proclaiming that “The people of Lower Saxony, 
con scious of its re sponsibility before God and Men, has, by their representatives, enacted 
the following Constitution”.
Any invocation of God seems to be of little relevance, however, and moderate as well 
as orthodox theologians even ﬁ nd it presumptious to have God invoked in a se cular 
constitution. In the fedarated State of Branden burg, the two Christian Churches themselves 
agreed on the omission of God from the new constitution.22 In 1949, it was, among others, 
the prominent Protestant Bishop of Berlin, Otto Dibelius, who rejected any reference to 
God in the Grundgesetz.23 In 1990, Wolfgang Ullmann, an outstanding Protestant cleric and 
East German dissident, deputy of the last Parliament of the German Democratic Republic 
and, after reuniﬁ cation, till his death in 2004, member of the Bundestag and the European 
Parliament for the Green Party, had sugge sted to completely drop God from the preamble of 
the Federal Basic Law.24 Therefore, not only the lack of legal signiﬁ cance should make 
legislators refrain from referring to God in State Constitutions. 
With regard to the missing ideological or reli gious homogeneity, in Germany and its 
Laender as well as in most of the other Euro pean States, the invocation of God might not 
prove to be fateful or momentous, but it has created and will create problems, e.g. at present, 
in Germany, with its Muslim minority. Here, Christian Wulff, now the German President, 
had appointed the ﬁ rst Muslim State Minister, when he was still head of government of 
Lower Saxony. When the nominee took her ofﬁ cial oath, adding, “so help me God”, she 
was asked what invoking God meant in her case, and she told an astonished audience that 
she was invoking Allah.
Following the much disputed remarks on integration in the speech held by the German 
President, Christian Wulff, on October 3, 2010, the discussion on whether there are religious 
values underlying the order of the Grundgesetz, has become more heated. Only ten days 
after that controversial speech, on October 13, 2010, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, a protestant 
scholar at the Munich University, internationally of great academic repute and of high 
theological standing, warned of the consequences of “babtizing” the Grundgesetz.25 
According to Graf, it would be utterly wrong to assert that the Grundgesetz is based on a 
“Christian-Jewish heritage”, the German constitution being the result of enlightened 
thought. And he cautioned against qualifying or modifying the difference between rights 
and religion and between rights and morals.
Thus, it seems that respect and esteem for God should make us hesitate to invoke Him 
carelessly in the se cular and profane context of any secular Basic Law or Constitution. 
22 Papenheim: op. cit. 163.
23 Murswiek: op. cit. marginal no. 23.
24 Papenheim: op. cit. 123.
25 Wir sollten das Grundgesetz nicht taufen [We should not babtize the Basic Law]. An Interview 
with Friedrich Wilhelm Graf. Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 13 October, 2010.
